Family Allowance and Pension Dependent on the Number of Children: Optimality and Neutrality : Reaction to „The Inherent Faults of the State Pension System and the Main Direction of its Improvement” by József Banyár by Simonovits, András
 Workshop – pension debates 
public Finance Quarterly  2020/1 31
A
András Simonovits
Family Allowance and Pension 
Dependent on the Number  
of Children:  
Optimality and Neutrality
Reaction to „The Inherent Faults of the State Pension 
System and the Main Direction of its Improvement”  
by József Banyár 
Summary: When it comes to the neutralisation of child-rearing burdens by the state, many experts support the introduction of 
pensions dependent on the number of children (or dependent on child-rearing) instead of family allowance (and tax allowance) 
(cf. Kovács ed., 2012). The critical review by Banyár (2019) joins this trend. Leaving external criticism aside, I assess Banyár’s 
plan of reduced pension of childless people and the remaining family allowance in the simplest possible optimisation model. 
The relative child consumption plays a key role. My main findings: a) in case of a critical relative value (when the total 
child consumption of the family equals the parents’ consumption), both pension of the childless and family allowance are 
dispensable; b) in case of a lower child relative value, the reduced pension of the childless is positive, and family allowance is 
dispensable; c) in case of a higher relative value, the pension of the childless is zero, but family allowance is indispensable.1
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Although Banyár and Mészáros (2003) have 
already examined the social security pension 
system dependent on the number of children 
in a multifaceted manner, the publication of 
Botos and Botos (2012) gave new impetus to 
the domestic debate around the issue (kovács, 
2012). (For the sake of brevity, we leave out 
the attribute ‘social security’, and we refer to 
the private pensions to be introduced for the 
childless as savings.) Numerous hungarian 
economists (for example Banyár, 2012) argued 
that this delayed transfer system is more 
suitable to neutralise child-rearing expenses 
than family allowance without delay (as well as E-mail address: simonovits.andras@krtk.mta.hu
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family tax allowance and in-kind allowances). 
This difference in terms of delay manifests 
itself emphatically in the case of the tens of 
thousands of hungarian workers moving 
permanently abroad at adult age. Although 
not every hungarian economist accepts the 
arguments (for example, Mihályi, 2012; 
2019; Németh, 2012; simonovits, 2012), the 
approach is dominant for the time being, and 
it detrimentally overshadows other questions, 
which are at least as important as this one (the 
increasing polarisation of pensions within 
retirement years and between retirement years; 
the blending of the rigid and the flexible age 
limit for retirement).
Banyár’s study (2019) has been published 
recently, and it provides a rich overview of the 
foreign and domestic literature on pensions 
dependent on the number of children. he 
is also in favour of the idea; he would deny 
childless people – subject to the obligation to 
pay contributions – pensions or would decrease 
their pensions to the minimum (as they can save 
the expenses of child-rearing), and he assigns a 
minimal role to family allowance. surprisingly, 
the article includes neither formulae nor 
numerical recommendations for the reform.
In this paper, I will model Banyár’s ideas in 
the simplest possible framework. I will set aside 
my own reservations, and I will only give an 
internal evaluation. For the sake of simplicity, 
there are no families and there are no genders 
(fathers have sons and mothers have daughters 
if you like), the fertility of those with children 
is identical (except for those in the Appendix), 
and that of childless people is, of course, 0. 
Furthermore, there is no growth, and the gross 
earnings of both types are identical. There is 
no inflation and interest, and labour supply 
and declarations of income are independent of 
the tax and contribution rates. I do not address 
some – otherwise very important – questions 
such as how to switch to such a system and 
how to operate it. I will examine only three 
minimalist models; they do not include any 
hypotheses which would improve the model 
family only in a quantitative manner but would 
leave their inherent characteristics unchanged. 
I specifically point out that contrary to, for 
example, simonovits (2014) we consider 
fertility independent of family allowances.
There is neither family allowance nor pension 
in Model 1; everyone takes care of their old age 
themselves. In the optimum the young and old 
age consumption of both types are equal. We 
suppose that those with children spend on their 
children’s consumption in proportion of their 
own adult consumption; therefore, the optimal 
consumption of people without children is 
greater than the (adult) consumption of those 
with children. (We call the proportionality 
multiplier the ‘consumption specific value of 
children’.)
In Model 2 people with children receive 
family allowance in the child-rearing period 
(including family tax allowance and other 
allowances relating to child-rearing allocated 
free of charge), and each pensioner receives 
the same pension. By appropriately selecting 
the family allowance and the contribution, 
neutrality can be ensured in addition to the 
optimum: adult consumption is independent 
of type. The two terms in the title are 
important because without them, the goal 
and behaviour of the individuals and the 
government would be unidentified. By the 
way, in the traditional approach individuals 
maximise their own lifetime utility function, 
whereas the government does the same to the 
social welfare function (cf. simonovits, 2014).
In Model 3 we analyse Banyár’s ideas about 
pensions maximally dependent on the number 
of children bare and appropriately modified. 
(The current French pension reform would 
increase the pension of mothers by a ‘mere’ 5 
percent per child, which would presumably 
not satisfy the domestic supporters of the 
system.) First and foremost, a classification 
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must be introduced: the child specific value 
is lower/higher than the critical value. (In 
our specification, this would precisely mean 
that the total consumption of children 
is lower/higher than that of the parents.) 
oddly enough, in addition to neutrality and 
optimisation this classification is also missing 
from Banyár’s paper, that is why no emphasis 
is given to the fact that in case of a lower 
specific value, childless people also receive 
pensions – even if a reduced amount – in the 
neutral optimum. In case of a higher specific 
value, however, besides the abolition of the 
pension of the childless the introduction of 
family allowance would be unavoidable in this 
system. Finally, we will deduct the continuum 
between the two extremities.
The realism of the model family can be 
enhanced by taking into account that a) the 
length of the time period spent in retirement 
and that of child-rearing is are about the half of 
the time period spent working, b) the number 
of children varies in families with children 
and c) gross earnings are heterogeneous. We 
briefly outline case a) and case b), and in case 
c), the pensions and the savings would be 
in proportion with the earnings, but family 
allowance would be replaced by the earnings-
dependent family tax allowance in case of an 
appropriately high maximum. The inclusion of 
the dynamics would present the real difficulty. 
In order to illustrate the scales, we illustrate 
our results through numeric examples.
The structure of the paper is as follows. 
After the introduction, section 2 examines 
the pure market system without transfers. 
section 3 formulates the neutral and optimal 
transfer rules. section 4 outlines the most 
natural implementation of this system: family 
allowance and uniform pension. section 5 
presents the combination of maximum pension 
dependent on the number of children and 
minimal family allowance. section 6 presents 
the numeric results of the generalisation 
mentioned in point a) for the critical relative 
value. section 7 draws the conclusions. The 
paper is closed by an Appendix.
LIFe cycLes WITH Pure MarKeT
In this section, there is no state that would 
modify the consumption of families with 
varying numbers of children by providing 
family allowance or differentiated pension. 
here and hereinafter most of the variables are 
arbitrary real numbers.
Two types coexist: h has n children (not 
necessarily an integer), L has no children, their 
weights in the population is are respectively 
f > 0, 1 − f > 0. population is stationary: fn = 1, 
that is, n = 1/f > 1. Both types earn the same 
amount in the first period (25–30 years), and 
the consumption of each child is φ times the 
adult’s: 0 < φ ≤ 1 is the relative consumption of 
the child. The consumption of all the children 
of one parent is φn. In this simple family model, 
there is no interest and population growth; 
therefore, we can safely consider savings sL and 
sh as differentiated pension contribution too, 
which is the pension itself, at the same time.
The following equations apply: 
Young age (adult) consumption
cL = 1 – sL and cH =
1 – sH .                                   (1)1 + φn
old age consumption:
dL = sL and dH = sH. (2)
As there is no interest rate, there is no 
discounting and the existence of the child 
does not make the parents happy by itself, 
in an optimal case young age and old age 
consumption are equal:
cL = dL     and    cH = dH. (3)
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Theorem 1 
In a pure market system the optimal savings of 
the two types are respectively
soL = 
1 and soH =
1 .                                      (4)
2 2 + φn
that is, the optimal consumption path of childless 
people moves above those with children:
coL = doL =
1 > coH = doH =
1 .                             (5)2 2 + φn
proof. Let’s start with type L. substituting it 
into (1L)–(2L)-t (3L) results in 1 − sL = sL, which 
is followed by (4L). Let’s continue with type h. 
substituting it into (1h)–(2h)-t (3h) results 
in 1 − sh = (1 + φn)sh, which is followed by 
(4h). substituting (4) into (3) results in (5).   
We illustrate our results through a numeric 
example. f = 1/2, that is, n = 2. Table 1 shows 
the market optimum for 3 specific parameter 
values – none is neutral. The higher the 
specific value, the more the adult consumption 
of those with children falls short of that of 
childless people.
NeuTraL TraNsFer sysTeMs
Alongside the market system, the modern state 
operates transfers dependent on the number 
of children and other (for example earnings-
dependent) transfers. Let the transfer given 
by type L be tL ≥ 0 and the transfer received 
by type h be th ≥ 0, that is the lifetime- 
balance
cL + dL = 1 − tL     and     cH(1 + φn) + dH = 1 + tH .
The sum of the given transfers equals that of 
the transfers received:
(1 − f )tL = ftH .
We will see that both family allowance and 
pension depending on the number of children 
divert individual lifetime consumption from 
lifetime earnings in favour of people with 
children. As average family consumption 
equals the average earnings, the following is 
true here as well
(1 − f )(cL + dL) + f [(1 + φn)cH + dH] = 1. (6)
The simplest way to express the equalising 
endeavours of family policy is neutrality. We 
define a transfer system neutral if the adult 
consumption pair is independent of the 
number of children:
cL = dL     and     cH = dH . (7)
Table 1
Optimal market cOnsumptiOn paths
children 
consumption
specific value
Without children With children Without children With children
savings adult consumption
φ sol s
o
h c
o
l = d
o
l c
o
h = d
o
h 
0.3 0.500 0.385 0.500 0.385
0.5 0.500 0.333 0.500 0.333
0.7 0.500 0.294 0.500 0.294
Source: own editing
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(We will see that there are various neutral 
transfer systems.)
In this section, we examine the potential 
neutral optimal transfer systems without the 
specification. In accordance with (3), the 
optimal young and old age consumption value 
of both types are equal. In a neutral case, 
however, the four values are equal, and their 
common value is e*.
Theorem 2 
a) Common adult consumption value in an 
arbitrary neutral optimal transfer system
e* = 1 .                                                         (8)2 + φ
b) The payment of a childless person and 
the payment of a person with children are 
respectively
t*L = φe
*     and     t*h = (n – 1) φe*:
Note. We can observe that under our 
hypothesis relating to stationary population 
– one young adult raises 1 child on average – 
the transfer paid by a childless person is 
precisely the consumption of one child, and 
the transfer received by a person raising n 
children is precisely the consumption of n − 1 
child. This can also be expressed by saying 
that the expenses of child-rearing are equally 
distributed between those without children 
and those with children.
proof. a) The lifetime consumption of 
type L is 2e, whereas that of type h (the 
consumption of the children being included) 
is 2e + φne. In accordance with (6),
(1 − f )(2e) + f (2e + φne) = 1,
which results in (8) by taking into account fn = 1.
b) in accordance with (8), due to the transfer 
given by a childless person
t*L = 1 – 2e* = 
2+φ–2 = φ2+ φ 2+ φ
and the transfer received by a person with 
children
t*H = (1 – f )t*L / f = (n – 1) t*L. 
FaMILy aLLoWaNce  
aNd PeNsIoN INdePeNdeNT  
oF THe NuMBer oF cHILdreN
In this section, we model the pension system 
currently in place in hungary: alongside 
family allowance (and other allowances 
dependent on the number of children), the 
pension is independent of the number of 
children.
Both types of workers pay τ pension 
contribution. (In fact, in hungary, those with 
children have been able to deduct the family 
tax allowance from the employee’s pension 
and health care contributions since 2014! If 
this correction were applied in the employee’s 
net earnings used in the calculation of 
pension, the hungarian pension system would 
be dependent on the number of children – but 
only in the case of those with lower earnings.) 
Furthermore, type L pays special tax θ, and 
type h receives θ (1 − f ) / f = θ (n − 1) family 
allowance. (In fact, everyone pays uniform 
special tax, but only those with children 
receive transfers from these – this was netted 
in the model, though.) Both types continue 
to live off pension b for a unit of time. The 
following equations apply:
Young age (adult) consumption:
cL = 1 − τ − θ     and    cH =
1 – τ + θ (n – 1) (9)1+ φn
old age consumption:
dL = dH = b. (10)
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The pension system is also self-financing:
b = τ. (11)
In the individual optimum, young and 
old age consumption are again equal for both 
types, and optimal neutrality can be achieved 
without savings by the appropriate choice of 
the contribution and the special tax.
Theorem 3 
In case of traditional family allowance 
and uniform pension, the optimal neutral 
consumption path is given by the following 
contribution and special tax:
τ∗ =
1  = e*    and    θ*= φ  = t*L. (12)2 +φ 2 + φ
proof. In the neutral optimum, in 
accordance with (10)–(11), the contribution 
equals adult consumption: τ∗ = e∗; and the 
optimal special tax equals the consumption of 
one child: θ∗ = φe∗.  
At the end of the section, we will illustrate 
our model with numbers again in Table 2. As 
the specific value is increasing, the pension 
contribution is decreasing while the special tax 
is increasing: in case  φ = 1 the two quantities 
are identical.
PeNsIoN dePeNdeNT  
oN THe NuMBer oF cHILdreN  
aNd FaMILy aLLoWaNce
Now, we are getting to the central question 
of our article: how can family allowance be 
reduced to the minimum by the maximum 
extension of pension dependent on the 
number of children while maintaining the 
neutral optimum? Furthermore, we assume 
that the pension of h is so high that he/she 
does not need to save for old age: s*h = 0, while 
the pension of L is so low that he/she has to 
retire with large savings to supplement his/
her reduced pension to an appropriate level 
[(17)].
Young age (adult) consumption 
cL = 1 − τ − sL − θ     and    cH =
1 − τ + θ (n – 1) .     (13)1+φn
old age consumption
dL = bL + sL      and     dH = bH . (14)
Table 2
neutral Optimal cOnsumptiOn paths: family allOWance  
and pensiOn cOntributiOn
children 
consumption
specific value
pension
contribution
special
tax
Without children With children
adult consumption
φ τ∗ θ∗ c*l = d
*
l c
*
h = d
*
h
0.3 0.435 0.130 0.435 0.435
0.5 0.400 0.200 0.400 0.400
0.7 0.370 0.259 0.370 0.370
Source: own editing
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pension contribution covers the pensions:
τ = fL bL + fH bH. (15)
The result of the case selection
Theorem 4 
In case of maximum pension dependent on the 
number of children, in function of the parameter 
values 3 different neutral optimums may exist.
If φn = 1, there is neither family allowance: 
θ* = 0 nor pension of the childless: b*L = 0.
If φn < 1, there is no family allowance: θ* = 
0, but there is a reduced pension of the childless: 
0 < b*L = (1 – φn) b
*
h < b
*
h = e
*.
If φn > 1, there is family allowance: θ* > 0, but 
pension of the childless does not exist: b*L = 0.
Note. The value of the appropriate 
contribution, family allowance and savings are 
shown in the proof. The most interesting result 
is the formula of the reduced pension of the 
childless: b*L = (1 – φn) b
*
h, that is, the pension 
of the childless decreases in proportion to the 
expenses of child-rearing.
proof. We suppose that there is a neutral 
optimum, and based on Theorem 2 all the 
adult consumptions of equation (13)–(14) are 
equal to e*. Let’s rewrite the neutral optimum 
of (13)–(14) to get a slightly simpler form:
e∗  = 1 – τ∗ – s*L – θ*    and     
e∗ = 1 − τ∗ + (n − 1)θ∗ − φne∗. (13´)
e∗ = b*L + s*L     and     e∗ = b*h . (14´)
by comparing the two equations of (13o):
s*L = n(φe∗ – θ∗). (16)
by comparing the two equations of (14o):
b*L + s
*
L = b
*
h . (17)
In words: (i) the savings of a childless person 
= number of children × (consumption of the 
child – special tax); (ii) pension of the childless 
person + the savings of the childless person = 
the pension of the person with children.
ad a) In case φn = 1 we can try θ* = 0= b*L 
selection, s*L = e* = b*h.
Then, in accordance with (14), τ* = e*/n.
ad b) In case φn < 1 θ∗ = 0 is appropriate, 
in accordance with (16) s*L = φne*, that is in 
accordance with (17), b*L = (1 – φn)e
* > 0. In 
accordance with (14),  τ* = [1 − (n − 1)φ]e*. 
ad c) in case φn > 1 the pension of the 
childless cannot be reduced further: b*L = 0, 
Table 3
Optimal cOnsumptiOn paths: pensiOn maximally dependent On the number  
Of children
children 
consumption
specific value
pension
contribution
special
tax
additional 
savings
Without children With children
adult consumption
φ τ∗ θ∗ s*l c
*
l = d
*
l c
*
h = d
*
h
0.3 0.304 0.000 0.261 0.435 0.435
0.5 0.200 0.000 0.400 0.400 0.400
0.7 0.185 0.074 0.370 0.370 0.370
Source: own editing
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so in accordance with (17)  s*L = e*, τ* = e*/n 
known from a) remains, but this time in 
accordance with (13-1), family allowance is 
θ* = 1 − n−1e* − 2e*.  
Finally, we illustrate Theorem 4 in Table 
3 through a numerical example. We show 
the case of a lower specific value in row 1, 
where family allowance is not needed, but 
the reduced pension of the childless is. row 
2 precisely includes the critical case, and in 
row 3 we present the case of a higher specific 
value, where the additional burdens of those 
with children are neutralised by the family 
allowance brought back, in addition to the 
anulled childless pension.
At this stage, it is worth mentioning that 
the common example of Botos–Botos (2012) 
is well approached by the 0 < b*L = (1 – φn) b
*
h 
< b*h = e
* formula of point b) of Theorem 
No. 4 if we calculate with φ = 2 / 7. Then 
bh / bL = 1,4 / 0,6 = 7 / 3.
Finally, we show that the transition between 
the minimally and maximally differentiated 
pensions is continuous. We index the variables 
and parameters of the undifferentiated and 
maximally differentiated system with N and 
D, and we leave out the asterisk everywhere 
(except for e).
Theorem 5 
The pension contribution realising the neutral 
optimum supplements the special tax covering the 
family allowance as follows:
τ(θ) = [1 − (n − 1)φ]e* + (n − 1)θ, 
where  
0 ≤ θD ≤ θ ≤ θN, (18)
where θD and θN are the functions of φ specific 
value not detailed herein.
Note: The special tax term is the family 
allowance itself. The higher the family 
allowance, to a lesser extent the pension of the 
childless must be reduced. Therefore, the more 
the contribution increases.
proof. According to (16)–(17)
bL = bH − sL = e∗ − n(φe∗ − θ) =  
(1 − nφ)e∗ + nθ. (19)
Let’s substitute (19) into (15):
τ = (1 − fH)[(1 − nφ)e∗ + nθ] + fHe∗.
Using that fh = n
−1, results in (18). 
Example: For the sake of simplicity, we 
separately examine the critical specific value: 
φ = 1/n = fh. Then the conversion function
τ (θ) = e
∗
 + (n – 1) θ, where θN = 0 és θD= φe*.
n
With the data of our previous numerical 
example: τ(θ) = 0,2 + θ.
sHorTer cHILd-rearINg PerIod  
aNd reTIreMeNT
In my previous works, I often used a simple 
modification which allows us to get rid of the 
rough assumption typical of two-generation 
static models: the length of the period of 
child-rearing and that of retirement equal 
the active period. We simply introduce a 
positive number µ ∈ (0.1], which reduces 
the length of the active period to the 
supposedly common length of child-rearing 
and retirement. I prepared this paper with 
this generalisation as well, but due to is 
complexity we only write down the simplest 
connections (by referring to the modification 
by using commas).
cL + µdL = 1 − tL     and     ch(1 + µφn) + µdh = 1 + th.
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Considering the average:
(1 − f )(cL + µdL) + f [(1 + µφn)ch + µdh] = 1. (6´)
Theorem 2’ 
The common adult consumption value in an 
arbitrary neutral optimal transfer system
e* = 
1 .                                               (8´)
1 + µ(φ + 1)
As comparison with the idealised case we 
write down the results of a market and two 
neutral models in Table 4 for the critical 
specific value (φ = 1/2). The pair of savings 
in (market) Model 1 decreased from (0.5; 
0.333) to (0.333; 0.25), and the pair of 
consumption goes up from (0.5; 0.333) to 
(0.667; 0.5). The contribution rate of 0.4 
of Model No. 2 (uniform pension, family 
allowance) decreases to 0.286 in a more 
realistic parametering whereas the adult 
consumption increases from 0.4 to 0.571. 
similarly, the contribution rate of 0.2 of 
Model 3 (zero pension of the childless and 
zero family allowance) decreases to 0.143 in 
a more realistic parameterization (whereas 
adult consumption increases from 0.4 to 
0.571).
coNcLusIoNs
In this short paper, we commented on the 
article written by Banyár (2019). Firstly, we 
presented what burdens are placed by the 
pure market solution on those with children. 
secondly, we analysed the harmonious 
joint operation of family allowance and 
the uniform pension system. Thirdly, we 
modelled Banyár’s pension system maximally 
dependent on the number of children, and 
we pointed out that there is a complicated 
quantitative connection between the optimal 
neutral family allowance and pension 
contribution:
a) if the child’s relative consumption is 
critical, neither family allowance nor the 
pension of the childless is needed, 
b) if the relative value is lower, family 
allowance is dispensable; but the pension of 
the childless can be abolished only partly,
c) if the relative value is higher, the pension 
of the childless can be reduced to 0, but family 
allowance is still needed.
Naturally, the quantitative findings 
formu lated herein are sensitive to the 
determination of the model family 
parameters. If we considered that the time 
spent both child-rearing and in retirement 
are shorter than the active period, or 
Table 4
neutral Optimal cOnsumptiOn paths: shOrter periOds
model
pension 
contribution
special 
tax
l h l h
savings adult consumption
τ∗ θ∗ s*l s
*
h c
*
l = d
*
l c
*
h = d
*
h
Model 1 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.250 0.667 0.500
Model 2 0.286 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.571 0.571
Model 3 0.143 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.571 0.571
Source: own editing
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pensioners consume less than workers, and, 
furthermore, positive fertility is were also 
varied, or if we formulated neutrality more 
vaguely or more strictly than we do herein, 
some of the quantitative relationships would 
probably change. however, our models are 
only for ‘playing’ and their purpose is solely 
to polish the mind.
1 I would like to express my gratitude to József Banyár for his help provided while the article criticising him 
was written. It is especially important to highlight here that this does not mean that my debate partner 
agrees with all (or even a single one of ) the statements expressed in the article. I must also thank Edi-
na Berlinger for her valuable remarks and the anonymous referee for their constructive criticism and for 
identifying a miscalculation.
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Appendix
a More reaLIsTIc dIsTrIBuTIoN  
oF NuMBer oF cHILdreN
In this Appendix, we address the hypothesis 
that all parents with children raise the same 
number of children. Let i = 0, 1, 2,  ..., I  be 
the number of children, and let ci, di and fi be 
the adult consumption of people with children 
i at a young and at an old age, and their weight 
in the population. Following section 6, the 
length of the period spent child-rearing and in 
retirement is µ ≤ 1.
For the sake of brevity we only generalise 
the neutral optimal transfer (sections 3 and 6).
Theorem A.1
The common adult consumption in the neutral 
optimum
e* = 
1 .                                            (A.1)
1 + µ(φ + 1)
Note. By comparing (8’ ) and (A.1) we 
can see that the hypothesis of binary fertility 
reflects at least the average well.
proof. Lifetime consumption of type 
i is ci (1 + µφi) + µdi . The average lifetime 
consumption in the balanced transfer system 
is 1:
 I
∑ fi[ci(1 + µφi) + µdi] = 1. (A.2)
i=1
By substituting into (A.2) the optimum 
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